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1. Introduction
The point of departure for most neuroeconomics is what has come to be called
behavioral economics. A reader of this literature might rightfully conclude that the old
rational man of economics has been rejected in favor of more realistic models of human
behavior  that  incorporate  insights  from  psychology.  The  old  model  supposes
hyperrationality of individuals and as a consequence existing economic theory is useless.
We can complete the behavioral revolution in economic thought by peering into the brain
in order to build far more models of decision-making.
Unfortunately this assessment of the nature  and state of modern economics is
false. In this paper I will document the basic strength of existing theory. It is only by
understanding  its  true  weaknesses  –  which  revolve  around  preferences  far  more  than
decision  making  –  that  can  we  understand  what  if  any  role  there  can  be  for
neuroeconomics.
2. Theory That Works
The critical thing to understand is that modern economic theory works well for
the problems that economists are the most interested in – both in the field and in the
laboratory.  Since  shortcomings  of  the  theory  naturally  get  more  emphasis  among
practitioners this basic fact often is inadequately understood.
Let us start in the laboratory. Here people – many times college undergraduates,
but often other groups from diverse ethnic backgrounds – are brought together to interact
in artificially created social situations to study how they reach decisions individually or in
groups.  The  heart  of  modern  “rational”  economic  theory  is  the  concept  of  the  Nash
equilibrium  of  a  game.  A  game  is  simply  a  careful  description  of  a  social  situation
specifying the options available to the “players,” how choices among those options result
in outcomes, and how the participants feel about those outcomes. Nash equilibrium says
that players do the best they can given the actual choices of their opponents.
One of the most controversial applications of the theory is to voting. Modern
voting theory, for example, the theory of Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996], is based on
the idea that your vote only matters when it decides an election – when it is pivotal. This
has implications for voter participation – that elections must be close enough to give2
voters an incentive for costly participation. Whether this is how voters behave is quite
controversial.
Levine and  Palfrey  [2007]  examined  voter  participation  in  the  laboratory.  We
divided participants into unequal teams of voters, and each voter was randomly assigned
a cost of participating in the election – known only to that voter. Each voter additionally
received a prize if their team received the most votes. We then  computed,  using  the
theory of Nash equilibrium and the assumption that voters were completely selfish and
cared only about their own money income, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
This is a difficult computation, hinging critically on the fact that the participation rate
must  be  such  as  to  make  the  pivotal  voter  indifferent  between  participating  and
abstaining. Indeed, we were able to solve the problem only numerically.
We then re-created the theoretical environment in the laboratory. The key aspect
is that we had no expectation that voters could guess, calculate, or otherwise intuitively
figure  out  how  best  to  behave.  Rather,  as  is  central  to  modern  economic  theory  we
imagined that given an opportunity to learn they would reach an equilibrium. So we gave
them ample opportunity to learn – voters got to participate in fifty elections each. The key
measure of how well the theory worked is to ask how the empirical frequency of pivotal
events and upset elections compared to the prediction of the theory. The figure above,
from Levine and Palfrey [2007], plots the theoretical predictions on the horizontal axis
and the empirical frequencies on the vertical axis. It should be emphasized that there are3
no free parameters – the theory is not fit to the data, rather a direct computation is made
from the parameters of the experiments. If the theory worked perfectly the observations
would align perfectly on the 45￿ degree line. As can be seen, they do.
This voting experiment is but a recent example a long tradition of experimental
economics – the most important finding of which is that market clearing – the heart of
most economics – happens quickly and easily in the laboratory. The graph above is taken
from  Plott  and  Smith  [1978]  and  shows  how  a  sequence  of  bids  in  an  experimental
double oral auction converges quickly to the intersection of the supply and demand curve
at $0.60.
3. Theory That Works? Ultimatum Bargaining
Not all economic theory works so well in the laboratory. One of the most difficult
areas in economics is the theory of bargaining – about which there is no widely agreed
upon theory. One of the most famous “failures” of economic theory in the laboratory
takes place in the ultimatum bargaining game. Here one player proposes the division of
an amount of money – often $10, and usually in increments of 5 cents – and the second
player may accept, in which case the money is divided as agreed on, or reject, in which
case neither player gets anything. This game is frequently analyzed using a “refinement”
of  Nash  equilibrium  that  requires  that  a  Nash  equilibrium  must  occur  whatever  the4
history of past play. In particular, in ultimatum bargaining, if the second player is selfish,
he must accept any offer that gives him more than zero. Given this, the first player should
ask for – and get – at least $9.95.
Not surprisingly this prediction – that the first player asks for and gets $9.95 – is
strongly rejected in the laboratory. The table below shows the experimental results of
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir [1991]. The first column shows how much
of the $10 is offered to the second player. (The data is rounded off.) The number of offers
of each type is recorded in the second column, and the fraction of second players who
reject is in the third column.
Amount of Offer Number of Offers Rejection Probability
$3.00 or less 3 66%
$4.75 to $4.00 11 27%
$5.00 13 0%
U.S. $10.00 stake games, round 10
Notice that the results cannot easily be attributed to confusion or inexperience, as players
have already engaged in 9 matches with other players. It is far from the case that the first
player asks for and gets $9.95. Most ask for and get $5.00, and the few that ask for more
than $6.00 are likely to have their offer rejected.
Looking at the data a simple hypothesis presents itself: players are not strategic at
all they are “behavioral” and fair-minded and just like to split the $10.00 equally. Aside
from the fact that this “theory” ignores slightly more than half the observations in which
the two players do not split 50-50, it might be wise to understand whether the “economic
theory” of rational strategic play has really failed here – and if so how.
The failure of the theory here is more apparent than real. First, the theory does not
demand  that  players  be  selfish,  although  that  may  be  a  convenient  approximation  in
certain circumstances, such as competitive markets. It is clear from the data that they are
not: a selfish player would never reject a positive offer, yet ungenerous offers are clearly
likely  to  be  rejected.  Technically  this  form  of  social  preference  is  called  spite:  the
willingness to accept a loss in order to deprive the opponent of a gain. Once we take
account of the spite of the second player, the unwillingness of the first player to make
large demands becomes understandable.5
Let us look more  closely  at  what  theory  really  tells  us  about  this  game.  Any
theory is an idealization. The preferences – in this case selfish preferences – we write
down are at best an approximation to players’ “true” preferences. Theorists incorporate
this idea through Radner’s [1990] concept of approximate or ε-equilibrium. Suppose that
i s  is a strategy choice by player i, that  i    are his beliefs about the play of his opponents,
and that  ( | ) i i i u s    is a numerical “utility” or “payoff” that player  i expects to receive
given his own strategy and beliefs. The condition for  ε equilibrium is that each player
should choose a strategy  i s  that loses no more than ε
( ) ( ) i i i i i i u s u s   ε   ′ + ≥ .
and  that  his  beliefs  i     should  be  correct.  If  0 ε =   this  is  the  definition  of  Nash
equilibrium. Why allow  for  0 ε > ? Simply put,  ε is our measure of how much the
“true”  preferences  of  the  player  differ  from  the  preferences  i u   that  we  have  written
down. So we allow the possibility that the true “payoff” to player  i from playing  i s
might be somewhat larger than we have written down, but by no more than ε. In effect ε
is a measure of the approximation we think we made when we wrote down a formal
mathematical model of player play, or of the uncertainty we have about the accuracy of
that model.
A measure of the accuracy of our model then is not given by whether play “looks
like  an  equilibrium”  but  rather  by  whether  ε  is  small.  Take  the  case  of  ultimatum
bargaining. We can easily compute the losses to players playing less than a best-response
to  their  opponent  as  averaging  $0.99  per  game  out  of  the  $10.00  at  stake.  What  is
especially striking is that most of the money is not lost by second players to whom we
have  falsely  imputed  selfish  preferences,  but  rather  by  first  movers  who  incorrectly
calculate the chances of having their offers rejected. Notice, however, that a first player
who offers a 50-50 split may not realize that he could ask for and get a little bit more
without being rejected, nor if he continues to offer a 50-50 split, will he learn of his
mistake.
In mainstream modern economic theory, a great deal of attention is paid to how
players learn their way to “equilibrium” and what kind of equilibrium might result. It has
long  been  recognized  that  players  often  have  little  incentive  to  experiment  with
alternative courses of action, and may as a result, get stuck doing less well than they
would if they had more information. The concept of self-confirming equilibrium captures6
this idea. It requires that beliefs be correct about the things that players actually see – the
consequences of the offer they actually make – but not that they have correct beliefs
about things they do not see – the consequences of offers that they do not make. Using
this concept we can distinguish between knowing losses, representing losses  a player
might  reasonably  know  about,  and  unknowing  losses  due  to  imperfect  learning.  In
ultimatum bargaining, of the $0.99 per game that players are losing, $0.34 are knowing
losses  due  to  second  players  rejecting  offers,  and  the  remaining  $0.63  are  due  to
incomplete learning by the first mover. The details of these calculations can be found in
Fudenberg and Levine [1997].
One message here is that between social preferences – a major focus of behavioral
economics – and learning – a major focus of mainstream economics – in this experiment
the  role  of  learning  is  relatively  more  important  than  social  preferences.  The  second
message  is  that  the  failure  of  the  theory  is  much  less  than  a  superficial  inspection
suggests. Simply comparing the prediction of subgame perfection to the data indicates an
abysmal failure of the theory. Yet a reasonable measure of the success of the theory is
that players lose only $0.34 out of the possible $10.00 that they can earn.
4. Equilibrium: The Weak versus the Strong
The key problem with  ε-equilibrium is not that it makes inaccurate predictions,
but rather than it can be a weak theory, often making far too broad a range of predictions.
The  ultimatum  bargaining  game  is  a  perfect  example:  with  $0.99 ε =   the  observed
behavior is as much an equilibrium as is all the first players demanding $9.95 and getting
it. While weakness is not a good thing in a theory, it is important to recognize that the
theory itself tells us when it is weak and when it is strong. When there is a narrow range
of predictions – as in the voting game, or in competitive market games – the theory is
useful and correct. When there  is  a  broad  range  of  predictions  such  as  in  ultimatum
bargaining the theory is correct, but not as useful.
To get a sense of the limitations of existing theory, it is useful to take a look under
the hood of the voting game described above. At the aggregate level the model predicts
with  a  high  degree  of  accuracy.  However,  as  anyone  who  has  ever  looked  at  raw
experimental data can verify, individual play is very noisy and poorly described by the
theory.  The  figure  below  from  Palfrey  and  Levine  [2007]  summarizes  the  play  of7
individuals.  The  optimal  play  for  an  individual  depends  on  the  probability  of  being
pivotal  (deciding  the  election)  and  on  the  cost  of  participation.  The  horizontal  axis
measures the loss from participating depending on the cost that is drawn. If – in the given
election – the cost drawn should make the player indifferent to participating, the loss is
zero. Otherwise it can be negative or positive,  depending  on  how  much  is  lost  from
participating. The vertical axis is the empirical probability of participating. The red dots
are the results of individual elections. The blue dots are averages of the red dots for each
loss level, and the green curve is a theoretical construct described below. The theory says
that this “best response” function should be flat with the probability of participating equal
to one until gains (negative losses) reach zero on the horizontal axis, then a vertical line,
then again flat with a value of zero for all losses that are bigger than zero. This is far from
the case: some players make positive errors, some make negative errors. The key is that
in this voting game, the errors tend to offset each other. Over voting by one voter causes
other voters to want to under vote, so aggregate behavior is not much affected by the fact
that individuals are not behaving exactly as the theory predicts. A similar statement can
be made about a competitive market games. By way of contrast, in ultimatum bargaining,
a few players rejecting bad offers changes the incentives of those making offers, so that
they  will  wish  to  make  lower  offers  –  moving  away  from  the  subgame  perfect
equilibrium, not towards it.
A key feature of the individual level data is that behavior is sensitive to the cost of
“mistakes.” That is, voters are more likely to play “sub-optimally” if the cost of doing so8
is low. The same is true in ultimatum bargaining: bad offers are less costly to reject than
good ones, and are of course rejected more frequently.
This fact: the weakness of incentives when players are near indifferent, can be
captured without any “psychological” analysis quite effectively through what has become
known as quantal response equilibrium, or QRE. This logistic choice model that has been
used by economists since McFadden’s [1980] work has become popular due to the work
of McKelvey and Palfrey [1995] in analyzing experimental data. It supposes that play is
somewhat random. Suppose that  ( ) i i s σ  is the probability with which player i plays the
strategy  i s . Let  0 λ >  be a parameter of the choice function. We first define propensities
with which strategies are played, ( ) exp( ( , )) i i i i i p s u s λ σ− = . This says that strategies that
yield  higher  utilities  have  higher  propensities  of  being  played.  The  QRE  equilibrium
probabilities are given by normalizing the propensities to add up to one.
' ( ) ( )/ ( ')
i i i i i i i s s p s p s σ = ∑ .
Notice that this formulation contains an unknown preference parameter λ. If  0 λ =  play
is  completely  random.  As  λ  becomes  large,  the  probability  of  playing  the  “best”
response approaches one. So we can interpret λ as a kind of index of rationality. To give
an idea how this theory works, in the voting experiment we can estimate a common value
of λ for all players. The corresponding equilibrium probabilities of play are given by the
green curve in the figure above, which does an excellent job of describing individual play
– although it makes roughly the same predictions for aggregate play as Nash equilibrium.
While QRE is useful in explaining a great many experimental deviations from
Nash equilibrium in games where Nash equilibrium is weak, it captures only the cost side
of preferences. That is, it recognizes – correctly – that departures from standard “fully
rational” selfish play are more likely if they are less costly in objective terms, but it does
not  attempt  to  capture  the  benefits  of  playing  non-selfishly.  It  cannot  capture,  for
example,  the  fact  that  under  some  circumstances  players  are  altruistic,  and  in  others
spiteful. The modern literature on social preferences and fairness including Rabin [1993],
Levine [1998], Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], and Gul and
Pesendorfer [2004] attempt to capture that idea. On the other hand we already observed
that incomplete learning is a more important source of deviations from the “pure” theory
than are social preferences. The QRE does a good job of capturing errors that arise from9
incomplete  learning  –  indeed,  it  is  implied  by  learning  models  such  as  the  smooth
fictitious play of Fudenberg and Levine [1995].
5. Selling a Jar of Pennies
One (incorrect) interpretation of economic theory is that nobody can every make a
profit. In fact there is a surefire way to do so. Put a bunch of pennies in a jar bring it to
class. Then auction off the jar of pennies.  You will find  you  can sell a $3.00 jar  of
pennies for almost $10.00.
This illustrates an important phenomenon known at the winner’s curse. Your class
stares at the jar and tries to guess how many pennies there are. Some students under guess
– they may guess that there are only 100 or 200 pennies. They bid low. Others over guess
– they may guess that there are 1,000 pennies or more. They bid high. Of course those
who overestimate the number of pennies by the most bid the highest – so you make out
like a bandit.
According  to  Nash  equilibrium  this  should  not  happen.  Everyone  should
rationally realize that they will only win if they guess high, so they should bid less than
their estimate of how many pennies there are in the jar. They should bid a lot less – every
player can guarantee they lose nothing by bidding nothing. So in equilibrium, they can’t
on average lose anything, let alone $7.00.
QRE  –  by  recognizing  that  there  is  a  small  probability  that  people  aren’t  so
rational – makes quite a different prediction. Let U  denote the most possible profit from
getting a large number of pennies at zero cost. Let u  denote the least profit by getting a
jar with no pennies at the highest possible bid. QRE says that the propensity of every
action  is  at  least  exp( ) p u λ =   and  that  no  action  has  a  propensity  greater  than
exp( ) P U λ = . Hence each person independently plays every action with probability at
least  / p MP  where M  is the number of possible bids. What happens as the number of
bidders grows? Each bidder according to QRE has at least a  p probability of making the
highest possible bid. With many bidders it becomes a virtual certainty that one of the
bidders  will  (unluckily  for  them)  make  this  high  bid,  so  with  enough  bidders,  QRE
assures the seller a nice profit.10
6. Matching Pennies
Matching  pennies  is  the  classical  zero  sum  game  where  each  player  chooses
Heads or Tails and one wins if they match, the other if they do not. Goeree and Holt
[2001]  studied  several  variations  of  Matching  Pennies  in  the  laboratory.  In  the  first
variation  the  payoffs  were  80  for  the  winner  and  40  for  the  loser.  The  only  Nash
equilibrium is for players to randomize fifty-fifty and they did just that. The table below
shows the theoretical Nash equilibrium of 50% and in parentheses the actual fraction of
subjects that chose the corresponding row and column. As you can see it is quite close to
50%.
50% (48%) 50% (52%)
50% (48%) 80,40 40,80
50% (52%) 40,80 80,40
Fifty-fifty is a particularly easy strategy to implement and the theory of mixed strategy
equilibrium is peculiar in that it predicts that each player must randomize so as to make
his opponent indifferent. This implies that in a mixed strategy equilibrium each player’s
play depends only on his opponents payoffs and not on his own.
To study randomization Goeree and Holt changed the payoffs by increasing (from
80 to 320) or decreasing (from 80 to 44) the payoff to Player 1 in the upper left corner. In
theory this should change Player 2’s equilibrium play, but Player 1 should continue to
randomize  fifty-fifty.  The  two  tables  below  show  the  theoretical  predictions  of  Nash
equilibrium and in parentheses what actually happened: far from continuing to randomize
fifty-fifty Player 1 played the row containing the highest payoff at least 92% of the time.
12.5% (16%) 87.5% (84%)
50% (96%) 320,40 40,80
50% (4%) 40,80 80,4011
87.5% (80%) 12.5% (20%)
50% (8%) 44,40 40,80
50% (92%) 40,80 80,40
The theory here does about as badly as it can: the theory predicts equal probability
between the two rows, but the actuality is that one row is played pretty much all the time.
Notice however that this experiment involves players who are inexperienced in the sense
that they only got to play the game once
The figure below is taken from Levine and Zheng [2010] and analyzes the game
using the tools of altruism, QRE and  ε-equilibrium. The vertical axis is the frequency
with which Player 1 chooses the Top row; the horizontal axis the frequency with which
Player 2 chooses the Left column. The laboratory results are shown by the black dots
labeled Lab Result with the upper left dot corresponding to the second matrix – the 44
game, and the lower right dot corresponding to the first matrix – the 320 game. The
theoretical prediction of Nash equilibrium – that Player 1 (and only Player 1) randomizes
50-50 – are labeled as Original Nash Equilibrium.
Several different ways of weakening the theory of selfish Nash equilibrium are
considered. The first is by computing all the approximate equilibrium in which the losses
are  no  greater  than  those  actually  suffered  by  the  participants.  This  is  the  light  gray12
shaded region. The second is by computing the QRE corresponding to differing levels of
λ. These are the light blue and red curves that begin at the respective Nash equilibria and
– as λ declines – move eventually towards the completely random outcome where both
players simply make each choice with equal 50% probability. The dark gray region and
the green and dark blue curves also examine approximate and QRE – but do so under the
hypothesis that some players are altruistic.
To understand what this diagram does and does not show, it is useful to start with
QRE. One prediction of quantal response is a tendency toward the middle. For example
in the 320 game Player 2 plays Left in Nash equilibrium 12.5% of the time. Quantal
response says that errors in play will push that towards the middle – toward a fifty-fifty
randomization, and indeed we see that in actuality 16% rather than 12.5% of Player 2’s
play Left. This in turn has a substantial impact on the incentives of Player 1: with “too
many” player 2’s playing Left, the best thing for Player 1 to do is to play Top and try to
get the 320 – and again this is what we see participants do. We see it also in the diagram.
As we vary the parameter of noisy choice away from Nash equilibrium and perfect best
response we see that QRE play shifts towards to the right – towards the lab result with
more Player 1’s playing Top. Similarly in the 44 game, “too many” player 2’s play Right
– 20% rather than 12.5% – and this tilts the Player 1’s towards playing Down. Again, the
initial effect of increasing the noise parameter is to move the QRE towards the lab result.
Eventually,  when  λ  becomes  too  small,  QRE  approaches  a  pure  fifty-fifty
randomization. What the diagram also shows is that this happens “too soon” in the sense
that play in the QRE  “starts back” towards fifty-fifty before it  gets to the laboratory
result. That effect is much more pronounced in the 44 game than the 320 game.
Next consider altruism. This is potentially important in the 320 game since Player
2 by giving up 40 can increase the payoff of Player 1 by 280 – you don’t have to be that
generous to take such an opportunity. This also can explain why “too many” Player 2’s
play  Left.  If  we  assume  a  combination  of  errors  due  to  quantal  response  and  some
altruistic  players,  it  turns  out  we  can  explain  the  320  game  quite  well,  as  the  curve
combining the two effects passes more or less directly through the laboratory result.
In the 44 game the situation is different. Even combining altruistic players with
quantal  response  errors  quantitatively  we  can  explain  only  about  half  the  laboratory
result. Here the approximate equilibrium regions can help us understand what is going13
on. Notice that in the 320 game the approximate equilibrium region while wide is not
very tall. While there are many possible strategies by player 1 that are consistent with a
relatively small loss, there are very few strategies by player 2: Player 2 must play Right
with  between  about  10%  and  20%  probability.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  44  game
approximate equilibrium indicates we can say little beyond Player 1 should play Top
more frequently than Bottom and Player 2 should play Right more frequently than Left.
The reason for this is not hard to fathom In the 320 game incentives are relatively strong:
by making a wrong choice players can lose between 40 and 280. In the 44 game by
making a wrong choices player can lose between 4 and 40. Naturally when incentives are
less strong the set of approximate equilibrium is larger and we are less able to make
accurate predictions of how players will play.
7. Is Traditional Theory Useless?
The financial market meltdown in October 2009 has convinced many that markets
are  irrational,  and  rational  models  are  doomed  to  failure.  Only  behavioral  models
recognizing the emotional “animal spirits” of investors can hope to capture the events
that occur during a full blown financial panic. Most of this sentiment springs, however,
from confusion about what rationality is and what rational models say.
Is it irrational to run for the exit when someone screams that the movie theater is
on fire? Consider the following simple variation on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. “Fire”
has been shouted in the theater. You can rush for the exits, or proceed in an orderly way.
If everybody rushes they all get 5; if everyone proceeds in an orderly way they all get 9.
However, if I rush and nobody else does I am sure to get out so get 10; on the other hand





This game has a unique dominant strategy equilibrium: everyone rushes for the exits.
Nowhere do we model the very real sick feeling of panic that people feel as they rush for14
the exits. That is a symptom of being in a difficult situation, not an explanation of why
people behave as they do.
The situation in a market panic is similar. Suppose you turn on the television and
notice the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board giving a speech indicating that the
financial sector is close to meltdown. It occurs to you that when this happens, stocks will
not have much value. Naturally you wish to sell your stocks – and to do so before they
fall in price, which is to say, to sell before everyone else can rush to sell. So there is a
“panic” as everyone rushes to sell. Individual behavior here is rational – and unlike the
rushing to the exits where more lives would be spared if the exodus was orderly, in the
stock market there is no real harm if people rush to sell rather than selling in an orderly
way.
In some circumstances people overdo it – and the price drops so much that it
bounces  right  back  up  as  soon  as  people  get  their  wits  back.  Perhaps  this  is  due  to
irrationality? Not at all – there is a beautiful paper written in 2009 by Lasse Pedersen
analyzing the so-called “quant event” of August 3-14 2007, where prices did bounce. The
first figure above shows the minute by minute real market price and the second figure
shows prices computed from the theory. The key thing to understand is that the theory is15
of pure rational expectations – irrationality, psychology, and “behavioral” economics do
not enter the picture.
The same idea applies to bank runs. If you think your bank is going to fail taking
your life savings with it, it is perfectly rational to try to get your money out as quickly as
you can. Of course if everyone does that it pretty much guarantees the bank will fail. This
is the classic Diamond and Dybvig [1983] model of bank runs – along with the some
3,639 follow-up papers. So far nobody has pointed out any facts or details about the 2009
crisis that is inconsistent with these models of rational behavior.
Economic theory, then, can understand panics. But can it predict them? No, it
cannot and for good reason. One essential thing that is often overlooked in behavioral
economics  is  that  economics  itself  is  not  neutral  in  human  behavior.  People  make
mistakes. Because they are mistakes, if those mistakes are explained to them they will
permanently change their behavior. Hence a theory of mistakes is always subject to the
problem that if people understand the theory it becomes invalid. A related phenomenon
occurs in markets. Suppose that we could forecast stock market crashes. A big computer
program that all economists agreed was right would be run and it would tell us “Next
week the stock market will fall 20%.” What would you do? Knowing the stock market
will drop 20% next week, would you wait until next week to sell? Of course not, you
would want to dump your stocks before everyone else did. And when everyone tried to
do that the stock market would drop by 20% – but not next week, it would happen right
now. You do not wait until you feel the flames before you rush for the theater exits.
Put another way, there is an intrinsic interaction between the forecaster and the
forecast – at least if the forecaster is believed. Predicting economic activity is not like
predicting the weather. Whether or not there is going to be a hurricane does not depend
on whether or not we think there is going to be a hurricane. Whether or not there is going
to be an economic crisis depends on whether or not we think there is going to be one.
And this is why the economics profession came to adopt the rational expectations model.
Unlike behavioral models – which treat economic activity like hurricanes – the rational
expectations  model  captures  the  intrinsic  connection  between  the  forecaster  and  the
forecast. In fact one description of a model of rational expectations is that it describes a
world where the forecaster has no advantage in making forecasts over anyone else in the
economy – which if people believe his forecasts will have to be the case.16
The fact that we cannot predict crashes does not mean that we do not understand
them. It is far from true that mainstream economics is blind “to the very possibility of
catastrophic failures in a market economy” as Krugman wrote in a 2009 New York Times
column.  That  is  the  same  Krugman  who  in  1979  wrote  a  paper  called  “A  Model  of
Balance-of-Payments.” This showed how under perfect foresight crises are ubiquitous
when speculators swoop in and sell short.  The paper is deficient in that it supposes that
crises are perfectly foreseen and – as indicated above – this cannot lead to catastrophic
drops in prices. However, the paper is not obscure, there having been some 2,354 follow-
on papers, including Salant [1983]. Salant uses the tools of modern economics, in which
the fundamental forces driving the  economy are not perfectly  foreseen, to show how
rational expectations leads to speculation and unexpected yet catastrophic price drops.
Despite  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  the  Salant  paper  is  integral  to  most  modern
economic models, it still never fails to surprise non-economists when market crises do
occur.  It  has  happened  in  England,  in  Mexico,  in  Argentina,  Israel,  Italy,  Indonesia,
Malaysia, Russia, and of course more than once in the United States.
8. Does Behavioral Theory Give Correct Answers?
While  behavioral  economics  points  to  many  paradoxes  and  problems  with
mainstream economics, its own models and claims are often not subject to a great deal of
scrutiny. Here I examine two popular behavioral theories.
The Naif at the Health Club
Consider the following facts from Della Vigna and Malemendier [2006] about
health club memberships. First, people who chose long-term memberships rather than
pay per visit paid on average $17 per visit as against a $10 per visit fee. Leaving aside the
hassle factor of availability of lockers and the need to pay each visit, we can agree that
this is some evidence that people are trying to make a commitment to attending the health
club.
In the idealized world usually studied by economists, there is no need for a single
decision-maker ever to commit. In reality we often choose to make commitments to avoid
future behavior we expect to find tempting but with bad long-term consequences: the
drug addict who locks himself in a rehab center would be an obvious example. The long-17
term  membership  in  a  health  club  has  a  similar  flavor.  Skipping  a  workout  can  be
tempting but has bad long-term consequences for health. Having to pay $10 will make it
easier to find excuses to avoid going.
So far so good for behavioral economics. They have identified a phenomenon that
standard models cannot explain – the desire for commitment in single-person decision
problems. Of course even with the commitment, some people eventually give up and stop
going to the health club. However, Della Vigna and Malmendier’s data shows that people
typically procrastinate for an average of 2.3 months before canceling their self-renewing
membership. The average amount lost is nearly $70 against canceling at the first moment
that attendance stops.
Leaving aside the fact that it may take a while to make the final decision to quit
the  club,  we  are  all  familiar  with  procrastination.  Why  cancel  today  when  we  could
cancel tomorrow instead? Or given the monthly nature of the charge, why not wait until
next month. One behavioral interpretation of procrastination is that people are naïve in
the sense that they do not understand that they are procrastinators. That is, they put off
until tomorrow, believing they will act tomorrow, and do not understand that tomorrow
they will face the same problem and put off again. There may indeed be some people that
behave this way.  But if  we  grant  that  people  who  put  off  cancellation  are  making  a
mistake, there are several kinds of untrue beliefs they might hold that explains this. One
is that they are procrastinators and do not know it. Another is that it is really simple and
inexpensive to cancel their membership, but people incorrectly perceive that it will be an
time consuming hassle  involving  endless  telephone  menus,  employees  who  vanish  in
back-rooms  for  long  periods  of  times,  and  all  the  other  things  we  are  familiar  with
whenever we try to cancel a credit card charge.
The question to raise about the naïve interpretation then is this. Which is more
likely: that people are misinformed about something they have observed every day for
their entire lives (whether or not they are procrastinators) or something that they have
observed infrequently and for which the data indicates costs may be high (canceling)?
Learning theory suggests the latter – people  are  more  likely  to  make  mistakes  about
things they know little about.
Another point worth mentioning is that so called “impulsive” behavior – that is,
giving in to temptation – is often everything but. Take Eliot Spitzer who lost his job as18
governor of New York because of his “impulsive” behavior in visiting prostitutes. Yet the
fact is that he paid months in advance (committing himself to seeing prostitutes rather
than the other way around) and in one case flew a prostitute from Washington D.C. to
New York – managing to violate Federal as well as State law in the process. Similarly,
when Rush Limbaugh was discovered to be carrying large quantities of viagra from the
Dominican Republic it was widely suspected that he had gone there on a “sex vacation” –
hardly something done impulsively at the last minute. Or perhaps a case more familiar to
most of us – how about the Las Vegas vacation? This also is planned well in advance,
with the anticipation of the rush of engaging in impulsive behavior. Of course, the more
sensible among us may plan to limit the amount of cash we bring along.
The point here is simple: our “rational” self is not intrinsically in conflict with our
impulsive self. In fact the evidence is that our rational self often facilitates rather than
overrides the activities of our impulsive self.
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Elicitation Procedure
Returning  to  the  theme  of  which  types  of  mistakes  are  most  likely,  another
paradox of behavioral economics is the so-called willingness to pay versus willingness to
accept. For example, if we ask people how much they are willing to pay for a coffee cup
they will state a relatively low value; if we give them a coffee cup and ask how much
they will sell it for they will state a relatively high value. On the surface this is not a
paradox: we all know to buy low and sell high. However: the elicitation of values is done
using a method called the Becker Marschak DeGroot procedure. A willingness to pay or
accept payment is stated, then a random draw is made. If the random draw is lower than
the stated value (in the willingness to pay case) then the item is sold at the randomly
drawn price. If the draw is higher than the stated value then no transaction takes place. In
the face of such a procedure the best thing to do is not to buy low and sell high, but rather
to state your true value.
This observation is fundamental to behavioral economics: it is sometimes called
the endowment effect or the reference point effect. It argues that there is a reference point
relative to expectations and gains and losses are measured against that reference point.
The argument is that having the cup in your possession changes the reference point so19
that losing the cup is a “loss,” while not having the cup in your possession means that
getting the cup is a “gain.”
But is any of this true? Is it obvious to you that when this procedure is used that
the unambiguously best course of action is to bid your true value and not buy low and sell
high? It is true, and subjects are often informed of this fact. So: is there a paradox here, as
some behavioral economists and psychologists would argue – and indeed base an entire
theory of behavior on – or is it simply the case that people have trouble understanding a
complex and unfamiliar procedure? The answer is the latter: Zeiler and Plott [2004] show
that  if  subjects  are  well  trained  in  understanding  the  elicitation  procedure  –  so  they
clearly understand that the best thing to do is to state their true value – then there is no
difference  between  willingness  to  pay  and  willingness  to  accept  payment.  If  the
observation that people have trouble understanding complex decisions and sometimes
make mistakes is “behavioral” then we scarcely need experimental evidence to prove the
point – the fact that students get exam questions wrong should be proof enough that
people fall short of complete and total rationality.
9. Can We Understand Decision Making by Peering into the Brain?
A basic fact from computer science is that all Turing machines are equivalent: we
can learn nothing of their capabilities by studying the specific way in which they are
implemented. The human brain is also a general purpose computing device, capable of
implementing  a  wide  range  of  algorithms,  ranging  from  simple  choices  between
alternatives to sophisticated algorithms such as dynamic and linear programming. The
types of decisions economists are interested in are generally implemented by means of
sophisticated algorithms, and these decision procedures rarely occur within the brain. At
a minimum paper and pencil are used, but of course we have access to computers as well.
When hedge funds decide how to buy and sell, for example, they do so by means of
computer programs that solve partial differential equations, not by some sort of impulsive
seat of the pants hunch about what stock is about to go up.
There is another way to view this. Suppose you wanted to study Microsoft Word
in order, say, to build a better word processor. Would you study the CPU of a PC? Would
you study how the RAM is wired? Or the ASICS? Would you study the binary code?
Surely you would do none of those things. Would you study the source code? Probably20
not even that, most likely you would use the program, observe how it worked, and figure
out how to build a program that did the same thing. That is what economists do. We
observe human behavior and figure out models that behave the “way humans do.” We
have no reason to believe that better understanding the wiring of the brain would improve
our models any more than understanding the micro-code on an x86 chip would improve
lead to improvements in word processors.
Where does this leave neuroeconomics? Of course there are one-time decisions
that must be made quickly – for example the Naval Frigate problem. This occurred as a
practical  matter  in  1989  when  a  U.S.  Navy  Frigate  thinking  it  was  under  air  attack
accidentally shot down an Iranian passenger jet. Here the sailors on the frigate had only a
few moments to make a quick decision based on imperfect information – shoot or not
shoot? Understanding the kind of biases they may have had on the spur of the moment –
ignoring certain information and attending to other information – can clearly improve
performance in these sorts of circumstances.
The  Naval  Frigate  problem,  while  important,  is  scarcely  the  kind  of  common
decision problem that is at the heart of economic problems. There is, however, a broader
contribution that neuroeconomics may hope to make to economics. Economists make the
useful distinction between preferences and beliefs. This is the same distinction as that
between goals and decision-making procedures. Given preferences – goals – economics
does a good job of understanding how these are translated into action. We do not need
neuroeconomics to come along and suggest that given their goals people employ some
kind of primitive mechanical decision making procedure – not least because it is not true.
On the other hand: economists struggle with the formation of preferences. How are goals
formed? How are short-term impulses reconciled with longer-term prospects? How do we
become angry? Humiliated? Why are we altruistic under some circumstances and spiteful
in others? Here in studying preferences and goals – where economics is weak – peering
into the brain may prove of ultimate use.21
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